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l.

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Prior to divorcing, Plaintiff Lynn Urrutia and her now ex-husband, Johnny Urrutia, were
the sole members of an entity named Sundance Arena, LLC. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 153-54.) The sole
asset of this LLC was the "arena property" that was the subject of this litigation, located at 3190
E 3500 N, Twin Falls County, Idaho. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16,25,30-38,57,60,175) As part of
their divorce settlement, Ms. Urrutia and Johnny distributed the LLC assets: the arena property
was awarded entirely to Johnny. (R., Vol. 1, p. 25.) The parties also secured payment of
Johnny's divorce decree monetary obligations with a Deed of Trust to the arena property; signed
by Johnny (with full power and authority as a member in a member-managed LLC) (R., Vol. 1,
pp. 153-54) with Ms. Urrutia as the beneficiary, and TitleFact, Inc., as the Trustee. (R.. Vol. 1,
pp.32-38.) Also included with this Deed of Trust recording was a quitclaim deed of Ms.
Urrutia's ownership interest in the arena property; though such interest was of course already
divested by the Decree of Divorce, anyhow. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-38.)
Johnny failed to make payment on his divorce obligations (R., Vol. 1, pp. 79-81), so,
pursuant to Idaho Code Sec. 45-1503(1), Ms. Urrutia filed an action to foreclose her Deed of
Trust. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16.) In the interim, Ty Harrison and Robert Schutte had occupied and
utilized the arena property. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 118-191.) Not
wishing to lose their rent-free riding arena, Defendants determined to record a mechanics lien,
forcing themselves to be named as defendants in Ms. Urrutia's foreclosure suit. (See, R., Vol. 1,
pp. 16,59-61.)
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After contentious discovery, Ms. Urrutia filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
seeking a determination that the Harrison/Schutte lien was invalid. (Appellant's Proposed
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 3-10; Respondent's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 4, pp. 1-115.) This
motion was granted, by decision on the record, on October 15,2012. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012,
Vasquez, pp. 61-66.) The lower Court found, upon the deposition testimonies submitted, that it
was absolutely clear that only use/maintenance of the arena property occurred in the ninety days
prior to the mechanics lien being filed; and therefore, no improvements occurred within ninety
days of filing, and the lien was therefore invalid. (ld; see also. Appellant's Proposed Augmented
R., Vol. 3, pp. 394-96.)
To that point, the only mechanics lien at issue in the case was the one recorded December
1, 2011. No party had ever amended to assert any other lien as any claim or defense. Therefore,
Ms. Urrutia certainly could not have filed summary judgment, nor could the lower-court h:lve
considered on summary judgment, any other alleged mechanics liens.
Only as of October 15,2012 was an amendment allowed to Defendants Harrison and
Schutte, to amend their Answer and Counterclaim. and assert a mechanics lien, recorded May 16.
2012. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez, pp. 68-69.) Defendants argued, and the lower-court
allowed the amendment, on the basis that it was a wholly separate lien: for work not beginning
until 2008, being done on a residential dwelling, not a riding arena, and for an amount different
than the December 1,2011 lien: $220,000.00. (Id.; see also R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-90.)
Therefore, after prevailing on invalidating the December 1, 2011 mechanics lien, the only
remaining claims between Ms. Urrutia and Harrison/Schutte were Harrison and Schutte's
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counterclaims. Ultimately, Ms. Urrutia prevailed on all remaining claims between these parties,
as they were all dismissed with prejudice. (R., Vol. I, pp. 302-304.)
Thereafter, Ms. Urrutia requested attorney's fees (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R.,
Vol. 3, pp. 658-669), and such fees were granted. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3,
pp.821-846.) Specifically, the lower court granted fees to Ms. Urrutia as the prevailing party on
claims of a commercial transaction, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). (Appellant's Proposed
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 827-837.) Particularly, the lower court found that Ms. Urrutia was the
prevailing party on all claims pled between her and Harrison/Schutte; again, Ms. Urrutia
prevailed on her claim to invalidate the December I, 20 II lien, and she prevailed on all of
Harrison and Schutte's counterclaims, as all such counterclaims were ultimately dismissed.
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 827-835.) The lower court further found that
the gravamen of the claims pled was a commercial transaction, because the counterclaims by
Harrison/Schutte against Ms. Urrutia was an allegation that she authorized/agreed to pay for
work on a commercial property. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. at 835-37.)
Additionally, the lower court alternatively held that fees were also appropriate pursuant
to I.C. 12-121. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 838-841.) Specifically, the
court again found that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party, and further found that Defendants
"frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation" "brought, pursued or defended" claims. (ld.)
The Court found that defending Ms. Urrutia's claim for invalidation of the December I, 2011
mechanics lien was frivolous at least after the depositions of Mr. Harrison and Mr. Schutte,
because their deposition testimonies plainly stated that in the 90 days just prior to recording, they
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had merely operated the horse arena, not made any actual improvements to the real property.
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 839.) Indeed, the Court limited Plaintiff's
attorney fee claim to much less than the fees claimed for the entire case. (Appellant's Proposed
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 658-669, 846.)
The Court also found that it was frivolous for Harrison and Schutte to defend the amount
of the lien claim, as more than $100,000 of the claim was, facially, payments on prior loans,
property taxes, and a payment to a title company; not improvements to real property.
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 839; R., Vol., 1, pp. 60.)
The court also found Defendant's prosecution of their counterclaims to be frivolous.
First, the Court found it frivolous for the Defendants to assert and prosecute their amended
counterclaim that the lien recorded May 16,2012 had priority over Ms. Urrutia's lien.
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 840.) The court found such claim was plainly
frivolous, because Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was recorded in 2007, and the May 16,2012
mechanics lien stated on its face that it only covered work commencing in 2008. Jd.
Additionally, the Court also found that the final counterclaim against Ms. Urrutia, for
unjust enrichment, was frivolous because it sought reimbursement for the same amounts listed in
the May 16, 2012 lien, such amounts stated to be incurred in 2008 and later, and the facts clearly
established that Ms. Urrutia had lost all ownership interest in the arena property in 2007.
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 840-41.)
Finally, the Court further found frivolous Harrison and Schutte's position with respect to
the preliminary injunction. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 841.) Specifically,
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while asserting that they were entitled to a mechanics lien for making improvements to the
property, the Defendants also asserted that none of the materials were fixtures, Le., were not
improvements to the property, and so no preliminary injunction preventing removal of the
materials was proper. (ld.) The lower court of course concluded that it was frivolous to assert
such diametrically opposed positions. (/d.)
The lower court also granted fees pursuant to I.C. 12-123, which allows for fees as a
sanction for frivolous conduct, even without finding a prevailing party. (Appellant's Proposed
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 841-43.) The lower court of coursed relied on its finding of
frivolousness pursuant to I.e. 12-121, and so, alternatively, also awarded fees pursuant to I.C.
12-123. (/d.)

Finally, the lower court also awarded fees pursuant to IRCP 11. (Appellant's Proposed
Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 843-44.) First, the court recognized that the requirement to only sign
filings after making "reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law ...." IRCP JJ(a)(1), is strikingly similar to the definition of "frivolous" found in I.C. 12123: conduct that is not supported in fact or warranted under law. (Appellant's Proposed
Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 843.) The court then held that it was a violation of Rule 11 for Mr.
Rockstahl to acknowledge, in his response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
that over $100,000 of the lien claim was not for improvements to property, and therefore plainly
improper under the lien statute, and yet continue to defend the claim, rather than withdraw or
correct the claim/defense. (/d.) The second lien claim didn't even attempt to correct the first, as
it stated that it was for different work, commencing in 2008, upon a residential property, and still
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claimed amounts for property taxes and payments to a title company. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 86-90.)
Again, the Amended Counterclaim also asserted that the second mechanics lien had priority over
Ms. Urrutia's lien, despite a priority date stated on the face of the second mechanics lien of 2008,
with Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust being recorded in 2007. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R.,
Vol. 3, pp. 840, 844.) The Court also found a violation of Rule 11 by signing the Amended
Counterclaim, asserting unjust enrichment against Ms. Urrutia, more than five years after Ms.
Urrutia lost her interests in the property (in 2007). (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3,
p. 844); see le. § 5-217.
After finding multiple and alternative grounds for awarding fees to Plaintiff, and despite
Defendants never challenging the amount claimed for fees, the lower-court nonetheless carefully
considered the factors in IRCP 54(e)(3), and actually reduced the fee award below the amount
requested by Plaintiff. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 844-46.) Ultimately
the lower Court awarded $10,000 in attorney's fees to Plaintiff, against Harrison and Schutte,
pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121, and 12-123, and awarded $2,500 in fees, against their
attorney Joe Rockstahl, pursuant to I.C. § 12-123 and IRCP 11. (Appellant's Proposed
Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 846.) These amounts were in addition to attorney's fees previously
awarded against defendants for discovery abuses, and for a contempt of the court's preliminary
injunction. (/d.)
Despite the lower court's extensive and thoughtful consideration of the facts and
procedure of this case, and the lower court's logical application of fee statutes to those facts,
utilizing its sound discretion, Defendants now challenge the attorney's fee award.
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II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

The only appellate issue, in addition to those stated by Appellant, is Respondent's claim
for attorney's fees on appeal. Ms. Urrutia claims costs and fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rules 40, 41, and 35(b)(5), and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 54,
and Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123. Additionally, BECO Const. Co.• Inc. v.

J-U-B Engineers Inc. very plainly states that if a party is entitled to fees upon an action in the
lower court, then, because an appeal, even just regarding propriety of fees, is simply a
continuation of that action, attorney's fees on appeal should also be awarded. 149 Idaho 294,
298 (2010).
III.

ARGUMENT

A) STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellants correctly state the applicable standards of review.

B) MS. URRUTIA CLEARLY HAD STANDING TO BRING HER CLAIMS, BECAUSE SHE
POSSESSES A PERSONAL STAKE IN THIS LITIGATION, AS THE PROMISSEE OFA
PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE BENEFICIARY OF A DEED OF TRUST, BOTH AT
THE CENTER OF THIS LlTIGATlON
Harrison and Schutte are correct that "standing ... may be raised at any time," even if
raised for the first time on appeal. Beach Lateral Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600,
603 (2006). However, Harrison and Schutte fail to understand that standing to bring a claim, and
the ultimate resolution of that claim, are two different issues.
Harrison and Schutte argue that Ms. Urrutia did not have standing to bring her claims,
because they believe her claim to foreclose should be denied, on the alleged basis that her Deed
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of Trust was not valid. Standing is not a question of the ultimate validity or success of a claim.
Indeed, Harrison and Schutte's own Appellant Brief cites case-law confirming this: '''The
doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not the issues the party wishes to
have adjudicated.'" Appellant's Brief, p. 5 (quoting Youngv. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102,
104 (2001» (emphasis added). Appellant's brief fails to even present any argument "focus[ing]
on the party": Lynn Urrutia; and instead focus their arguments solely on an "issue the party
wishe[d] to have adjudicated": the validity of Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust. Properly focusing
instead on the party, Ms. Urrutia, it is clear that Ms. Urrutia had standing to bring a claim to
foreclose her Deed of Trust.
The issue of standing simply asks whether the party has a "personal stake" in the
outcome of the controversy. Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 375 (1999). Ms.
Urrutia's claim with respect to Harrison and Schutte was her claim to foreclose her Deed of Trust
on the arena property. (R., Vol. I, pp. 15-16.) The outcome of every foreclosure controversy is
a determination of whether the subject lien is valid, and whether grounds exist (such as default)
to foreclose the lien. See generally, 51 AM. JUR. 2D LIENS § 86. Certainly a party named as a
beneficiary in a Deed of Trust has a personal stake in determining whether that lien is valid and
enforceable. See, id. (stating that the lienor is the party who should bring an action for
foreclosure). Therefore, Ms. Urrutia, as the lienor (beneficiary under a deed of trust) certainly
has standing to bring her foreclosure action.
Again, Appellants have not actually argued about Ms. Urrutia's standing, but instead
attempt to argue the validity of her lien. However, the lower-court determined, on Motion for
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Partial Summary Judgment, that Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was valid, that a default had
occurred, and that Ms. Urrutia was entitled to foreclose; the Court simply delayed allowing a
foreclosure sale until the full extent of the real property (what materials were fixtures and what
materials were instead removable personal property) could be determined. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,
2012, Vasquez, pp. 62, 70; Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 394-396.) Harrison
and Schutte never challenged the validity of Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust during the proceedings
on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp.
107-117; Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez, pp. 4-56.) The entirety of the record also shows that
Harrison and Schutte never requested the lower court to reconsider this determination, and s()
never raised the issue of validity in the court below. Because the issue of the validity of Ms.
Urrutia's lien was not properly raised in the court below, it cannot now be considered on appeal.

See, Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,236 (201O)(internal
citations omitted).
Furthermore, the validity of Ms. Urrutia's lien bears no relevance to Harrison's,
Schutte's, or Rockstahl's frivolous acts and resultant liability for attorney's fees. The only
relevance it could possibly have was to Harrison and Schutte's claim for fees against Ms.
Urrutia, alleging frivolousness by her. However, Harrison and Schutte do not appeal the lower
court's determination denying them fees against Ms. Urrutia. Therefore, the validity of Ms.
Urrutia's Deed of Trust is in no way even relevant to the issues presented on this appeal.
Because the ultimate validity of Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust is irrelevant to Ms. Urrutia's
standing in this case, has been determined below without Appellants ever contesting the issue,
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thereby waiving the issue for appeal, and is in no manner relevant to the issues before this
appellate court; and because Ms. Urrutia certainly has a personal stake in determining the
validity of her lien, and other liens claimed against the same real property, the lower court
properly granted attorney's fees to Ms. Urrutia, despite Harrison's and Schutte's arguments
regarding "standing."
C) THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MS. URRUTIA

AS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN A DISPUTE FOR WHICH THE GRAVAMEN OF THE
ACTIONS INVOLVED ALLEGATIONS OF A COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION
Idaho Code § 12-120(3), in conjunction with IRCP 54, requires an award of reasonable
attorney's fees to a party who prevails in an action for recovery in a commercial transaction.
Appellants challenge both the lower court's determination that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing
party, and the lower court's determination that the gravamen of the claims between these parties
was for recovery upon commercial transaction(s).
The Lower Court Properly Exercised its Discretion to Determine that Ms. Urrutia was the
Prevailing Party
1)

The determination of the prevailing party in a lawsuit is referred to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and should not be overturned except upon a finding of abuse of discretion.

Mihalko v. Shepard, 145 Idaho 547, 549 (2008). An abuse of discretion inquiry asks whether 1)
the lower court understood the issue as one of discretion; 2) applied correct legal standards to
guide and set the outer boundaries of its discretion; and 3) made its determination with the proper
exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center. Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94
(1991). Appellants apparently do not challenge that the lower court recognized the issue as one
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of discretion, nor do they appear to challenge the legal standards enunciated by the lower court
and applied to help guide its discretion. Rather, the Appellants only challenge the lower court's
application of correct legal standards to the facts; i.e., whether the lower court reached its
decision with proper reasoning.
In arguing that the lower court did not exercise reason, Harrison and Schutte contend that
Ms. Urrutia could not have prevailed, because "Ms. Urrutia obtained no relief and the entire suit
was ultimately dismissed." Appellant's Brief, p. 9. However, this assertion is simply not true.
The only claims at issue between these parties were 1) Ms. Urrutia's claim, as part of her
foreclosure claim, to have the December 1,2011 mechanics lien invalidated; 2) Harrison and
Schutte's amended counterclaim asserting that their May 16,2012 mechanics lien, with a stated
priority date of2008, was higher in priority than Ms. Urrutia's 2007 recorded Deed of Trust; and
3) Harrison and Schutte's amended counterclaim for unjust enrichment by way of Ms. Urrutia
gaining the benefit of Harrison and Schutte's alleged 2008 and post-2008 work upon property for
which Ms. Urrutia had lost all ownership interest in 2007. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16,82-90.)
Ms. Urrutia clearly prevailed on her claim, to invalidate the December 1, 2011 mechanics
lien, as she obtained partial summary judgment of the same. (Tr., Vol. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez,
pp. 61-66; Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 394-396.) Ms. Urrutia also clearly
prevailed on Harrison and Schutte's counterclaims against her, as all were dismissed, with
prejudice. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 846; R., Vol. 1, pp. 302-304.)
Therefore, the record plainly discloses that Ms. Urrutia prevailed on each and every claim ever
pled between these parties, and Harrison and Schutte did not prevail on any claims pled. The
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lower court plainly recognized this fact, and then properly concluded that Ms. Urrutia was the
prevailing party. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 827-35); Daisy

Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 262 (Ct. App. 2000) (abrogated on
other grounds by BECO Construction Co. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294 (2010)
(holding that obtaining prejudicial dismissal of a claim does constitute prevailing on a claim;
recognized holding in Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 692 (Ct. App. 1984) to not be
inconsistent, because Chenery only held dismissal did not make a prevailing party when there
were multiple claims and counterclaims, and only one claim was dismissed); Sanders v.

Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 326 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that prevailing on a single claim, in a
single claim case, does constitute a prevailing party; and holding that gaining a dismissal of a
claim against you, even without trial or otherwise passing on the merits, also constitutes a
prevailing party).
The lower court did mention, in dicta, some context, such as the fact that Ms. Urrutia
would have ultimately conducted the foreclosure sale she was entitled to, if a senior lien-holder
had not done so first. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 835.) However, such
contextual musings clearly were not the basis of the lower court's decision; the fact that Ms.
Urrutia prevailed on all claims pled between the parties was the basis of the lower-court's
determination that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R.,
Vol. 3, pp. 827-35.)
Furthermore, even if a lower court cites an improper basis for its decision, the decision
should still be upheld if some proper grounds exists. Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling and
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Pump Co. Inc., 153 Idaho 735, 740 (2012). Although questions arise when a party prevails on
some claims pled but does not prevail on others, the law in Idaho is clear, that a party who
actually gains a favorable judgment on all claims pled between parties is certainly the prevailing
party. Daisy Manufacturing Co., supra; Sanders, supra; Chenery, supra. The record is clear
that Ms. Urrutia obtained judgment in her favor on all claims pled between the parties, and
therefore, Idaho law dictates that she is the prevailing party, and the determination of the lower
court should not be overturned.
Appellants argue that they at least partially prevailed on the basis that they obtained
possession of various items of personal property that were, at one time, located upon the subject
arena property. However, even after being granted leave to amend, Harrison and Schutte never
made any claim for possession of personalty. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-90.) Instead, and despite
arguing regarding a preliminary injunction that all materials on the property were not
incorporated into the real property, Harrison and Schutte's claims and defenses, actually pled,
asserted that they had incorporated all of those materials into the real property, improving the
real property, and entitling them to a mechanics lien. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol.
3, pp. 28-106, 583-599; R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-90.) To then hold that Harrison and Schutte
nonetheless partially prevailed would be to sanction the tort of "abuse of process."
The tort of"abuse of process" is committed when a person utilizes the legal process to
obtain a result outside the scope of the process itself. 1 AM. JUR. 20 ABUSE OF PROCESS § 1. The
purpose of the mechanics lien process is to provide a means to mechanics and materialmen to
recover payment for their goods and services, which have been lost to incorporation into real
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property, out ofthe real property itself. 1 e. § 45-501, et seq. If the goods are still personal
property, i.e., not incorporated into the real property, one clearly cannot obtain a lien for the
value of such goods. Id. Instead, the provider of goods must simply bring an action for
possession of the personalty. Therefore, to attempt to obtain possession of personal property by
means of a claim to foreclose a mechanics lien is an attempt to obtain a result outside the scope
of the mechanics lien process; i.e., is a commission of the tort "abuse of process." Certainly one
cannot conclude that Harrison and Schutte were prevailing parties, even in part, by committing
the tort of abusing the civil court process.
Therefore, the record is clear that Ms. Urrutia obtained favorable judgment on each and
every claim actually pled between the parties, and it was therefore wholly proper, and certainly
not an abuse of the lower-court's discretion, to conclude that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing
party for purposes of an attorney's fee award.
2)
The Lower Court Properly Concluded that the Gravamen of the Claims between the
Parties Alleged a Commercial Transaction, Entitling Ms. Urrutia to an Award of her Reasonable
Attorney's Fees
Attorney's fees should be awarded, pursuant to Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3), when a
commercial transaction is the "gravamen" of the causes of action. I.e. § 12-120(3); Garner v.
Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469 (2011). A commercial transaction is the gravamen of claims when
the opposing party alleges a commercial transaction as the basis of his claim/defense. Id. (citing
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73 (1994)). In other words, a party cannot avoid a
fee award pursuant to 12-120(3) when the party itself asserts in its pleadings (likely in hopes of
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obtaining attorney's fees if he had prevailed) that a commercial transaction is the basis of the
claims. /d
Importantly, it matters not whether a commercial transaction is actually proved. /d
Indeed, if such were required, then only the claimant would ever be entitled to fees under 12120(3). Obviously if the defending party prevails, it has proved that in fact no commercial
transaction did exist to entitle the claimant to relief. Therefore, if actual proof of a commercial
transaction were necessary, a defendant would never be able to obtain fees. /d. This is clearly
not the intent of the fees statute. Rather, either prevailing party, whether it is the claimant or
defendant, is entitled to fees if the claims allege an underlying commercial transaction. Id
Appellant's only argument against an award of fees pursuant to 12-120(3) is that in/act there
was no contract between them and Ms. Urrutia. As such is plainly held to be immaterial (the
basis of the claims alleged are what matters) Harrison and Schutte's appeal of 12-120(3) fees
must fail.
In this case, as recognized by the lower court, the basis of the claims pled is clearly an
allegation of a commercial transaction. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 837.)
"Here, the counterclaim alleges a contract between the parties. The mechanics lien incorporated
into the counterclaim alleges a contract. . .. There is no dispute, and the Court finds, that the
Sundance Arena is a commercial property dedicated to horse related events and that the claim
that Ms. Urrutia and Johnny authorized work on the arena and that Ms. Urrutia was unjustly
enriched by the improvements defendants made is a commercial transaction." (/d; see also, R.,
Vol. 1, pp. 1-19; 50-61, 82-90.)
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Harrison and Schutte plainly alleged a commercial transaction underlying a mechanics
lien, in order to defend Ms. Urrutia's claim to invalidate their mechanics lien; they plainly
alleged a commercial transaction with Ms. Urrutia, benefiting Ms. Urrutia, as the basis of their
counterclaim for unjust enrichment; and the same commercial transaction was alleged as the
basis of the second mechanics lien, asserted in the counterclaim. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 1-19; 50-61,
82-90.) Therefore the basis of the claims and defenses between the parties was an alleged
commercial transaction, and therefore, attorney's fees pursuant to I.e. 12-120(3) were properly
granted.

D) THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MS. URRUTIA
UNDER THE ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF A PREVAILING PARTY IN A CASE WHERE
THE OPPOSING PARTY BROUGHT, PURSUED, OR DEFENDED CLAIMS
FRIVOLOUSLY
The lower court also, and alternatively, awarded fees to Ms. Urrutia pursuant to Idaho
Code Sec. 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(l). (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 83841.) Idaho Code Sec. 12-121, in conjunction with IRCP 54(e)(1) allows an award of fees, to a
prevailing party, if the Court finds "from the facts presented to it that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." IRCP 54(e)(J). Such a
determination is submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and therefore can only be
overruled if the appellate court finds the lower court abused this discretion. Thomas v. Madsen,
142 Idaho 635, 639 (2006).
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Harrison and Schutte argue that the lower court's alternative award of fees pursuant to
12-121 and IRCP 54(e)( 1) should be overturned on the alleged basis that perhaps some, but not
all of their defenses and claims were frivolous.

Again, the claims between these parties are the portion of Ms. Urrutia's foreclosure
claim, seeking to invalidate the December 1,2011 mechanics lien, and Harrison and Schutte's
counterclaims for priority of the May 16, 2012 lien, and for unjust enrichment. The lower court
properly considered Harrison and Schutte's defense to Ms. Urrutia's claim, and Harrison and
Schutte's counterclaims, and in fact found that the defense, and both of the counterclaims were
all pursued frivolously.
First, the lower Court determined that it was frivolous to defend Ms. Urrutia's claim to
invalidate the December 1, 2011 lien after Harrison and Schutte plainly admitted in their
depositions that they had not made any improvements to, but merely operated, the real property,
within the ninety days just prior to recording the lien, in violation of the lien timing statute.
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, p. 839); see, I.C § 45-507; see, Mitchell v.
Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 231 (1997) (holding that the labor is completed, to begin the running of

the ninety days, when the last major project is completed; and the time to file is not extended by
doing minor repairs, maintenance, or cleanup). The record indisputably required this conclusion.
(Appellant'S Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 46-47, 56-58, 84, 91-92.) Most obviously, Mr.
Harrison testified that all that was done in September, October, and November of2011 (slightly
more than the ninety days just prior to the December 1 recording date) was "hauling manure and
hauling hay and breaking ice and cleaning water buckets." (Appellant's Proposed Augmented
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R., Vol. 3, pp. 91-92.) Therefore, it was indeed absolutely clear, after the deposition of Mr.
Harrison, that continuing to pursue defense of Ms. Urrutia's claim to invalidate the December 1,
2011 mechanic's lien was not supported by facts or warranted by law.
Furthermore, the lower court acknowledged that it could therefore only award fees
incurred after the date of the deposition. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 839.)
And indeed, the Court limited Plaintiffs attorney fee claim to significantly less than the fees
claimed for the entire case; only granting $10,000 against Harrison and Schutte, of the more than
$20,000.00 claimed. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 658-69, 846.) Therefore,
there was no abuse of discretion in the lower court's determination of frivolousness of Harrison's
and Schutte's defense after the date of the deposition.
Furthermore, though unnecessarily, the lower court also determined that defense of Ms.
Urrutia's invalidation claim was also frivolous, from the very begirming, to the extent the
defense asserted all elements of the December 1, 2011 lien. Just as they argued in the court
below, Harrison and Schutte argue on appeal that defending the amount of the lien was not
frivolous, simply because the proper amount would eventually be determined upon trial.
However, under such logic, no claim or defense could ever be brought or pursued frivolously,
simply because the claim or defense would eventually be defeated at trial. Obviously I.e. § 12121 and IRCP 54 cannot be interpreted to be self-defeating.
Therefore, the lower court properly rejected Appellant's argument below, and the same
argument should be rejected now. Rather, the lower court properly found that the statute is
absolutely clear that a mechanics lien can only cover labor done, and materials provided, to the
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improvement of real property. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 839); IC § 45501. The December 1, 2011 lien patently claimed amounts for payments to a title company,

payments for property taxes, and other non-descript payments. (R., Vol., 1, pp. 60.) The
problem was not simply a miscalculation of the dollar amount of valid elements of labor or
materials. Rather, the elements themselves were obviously outside the scope of the mechanics
lien statute, even upon a cursory statutory review. Therefore, defending these elements of the
lien, even from the very beginning, was very clearly not warranted by law, and the lower court
did not abuse its discretion in noting this frivolousness as an additional basis for an award of fees
pursuant to Idaho Code Sec. 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(1).
Additionally, the lower court also properly concluded that pursuing both of Harrison's
and Schutte's counterclaims was frivolous.
The court concluded it was frivolous for Defendants to assert a counterclaim for priority
of the May 16, 2012 lien, above Ms. Urrutia's lien, because the May 16, 2012 lien plainly stated
that the work began in 2008, and Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was plainly recorded in 2007.
(Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 840; R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-38, 86-90.) On appeal,
Harrison and Schutte attempt to argue that the priority date of the May 16, 2012 lien could have
been 2006, despite the fact that it stated on its face that work began in March, 2008. Appellants
cite to Mr. Urrutia's deposition testimony. However, such deposition only concerned the only
lien being defended or otherwise at issue in the litigation at the time of the deposition: the
December 1,2011 mechanics lien. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 332-365)
(clearly showing that Johnny Urrutia's deposition was taken on April 17, 2012, at p. 365).
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Therefore, the only evidence of record regarding the dates of work subject of the May 16,2012
lien is what is claimed on the face of the lien itself.
Additionally, there is no evidence of record that the May 16, 2012 lien is for the same
work as the December 1, 2011 lien. The liens claim different start dates, the May 16, 2012 lien
claims it is for work on a residential property, and the table attached to the May 16,2012 lien
asserts different categories/elements of the lien, and different dollar amounts. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 5961,86-90.) Therefore, the face of the May 16, 2012 lien, the only "evidence" of record
regarding the May 16, 2012 lien, clearly concerns work distinct from the December 1, 2011 lien,
and only makes claim for work conducted since 2008. Id Such being the case, it was absolutely
clear from the time the counterclaim was made that in fact it was lower in priority than M~.
Urrutia's lien, plainly recorded in 2007. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-38.) Asserting such counterclaim
was therefore not in any manner warranted by law, and the lower court's determination that the
counterclaim was frivolous was not an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, the lower court also determined that the final claim between the parties,
Harrison and Schutte's counterclaim for unjust enrichment, was also brought and pursued
frivolously. The lower court concluded that there was clearly no benefit conferred upon Ms.
Urrutia, because the alleged benefit was the same work claimed in the May 16, 2012 lien, begun
in 2008, and Ms. Urrutia lost her ownership interest in 2007. (Appellant's Proposed Augmented
R., Vol. 3, pp. 840-41.) If Ms. Urrutia has no ownership interest in the property, improvements
made plainly cannot confer a benefit upon her. Id
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Harrison and Schutte agree that the law is absolutely clear that some benefit must have
been conferred upon Ms. Urrutia, by Harrison and Schutte, in order to support their claim, and
avoid a frivolousness determination. Harrison and Schutte assert that because they improved the
property, it is worth more, and Ms. Urrutia would be benefited if she foreclosed. Harrison and
Schutte's logic is skewed.
Being a beneficiary to a deed of trust does not provide any ownership interest to Ms.
Urrutia, nor give her any right to take ownership of the property, even upon default. Even
obtaining a foreclosure only provides Ms. Urrutia the right to conduct a foreclosure sale, and
then, only obtain reimbursement up to the amount secured by her Deed of Trust. The amount
secured, the amount that Ms. Urrutia may obtain upon foreclosure and sale, is not affected by
any improvements that Harrison and Schutte mayor may not have contributed to the property.
Because their alleged work can thus in no manner increase the value of Ms. Urrutia's security
interest (her only interest since 2007), Harrison and Schutte's alleged work on the property can
in no manner have conferred a benefit upon Ms. Urrutia, as a clear matter oflaw. Their
counterclaim for unjust enrichment was therefore not supported by facts, nor warranted by any
existing law, and the lower court's determination cannot be overturned on appeal.
Finally, although it was not necessary to find frivolousness regarding Harrison and
Schutte's position regarding the preliminary injunction, as such was not a claim or defense, the
lower court also found that it was frivolous for Harrison and Schutte to, in one breath, claim that
they had incorporated significant materials into the real property,justif)1ing a mechanics liel.; and
yet also claim, in the next breath, that virtually all of the materials were not incorporated, but
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were simply detached personalty that they should be free to remove. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 28-30, 104106; Appellant's Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 476-77, 583-99, 841.) Obviously, such a
contradictory position regarding the preliminary injunction makes pursuit of the counterclaims
all the more frivolous.
Therefore, the lower court properly found that each and every of Harrison and Schutte's
defenses and claims was pursued frivolously, and therefore properly awarded attorney's fees,
alternatively, pursuant to LC. 12-121 and IRCP S4(e)(l).

E) HAVING PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ALL OF DEFENDANTS' DEFENSES AND
CLAIMS WERE BROUGHT AND PURSUED FRIVOLOUSLY, IT WAS OF COURSE
PROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT TO ALSO, AND ALTERNATIVELY, AWARD
FEES AS A SANCTION FOR ANY FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT
Attorney's fees can be awarded as a sanction for any frivolous conduct at any time during
litigation, irrespective of whether a party prevailed. I.e. § 12-123. Frivolous conduct is defined
as asserting any claim, defense, position, or otherwise taking any action, respecting the litigation,
not supported by fact or warranted by law. Id It is important to note that it is not necessary for
all conduct of Harrison and Schutte to have been frivolous to justify a fee award pursuant to 12123. Any incident of frivolous conduct is sufficient to justify a fee award as a sanction. Id
Therefore, if any of the lower court's conclusions of frivolousness in its analysis under 12-121
are upheld, then its award of fees pursuant to 12-123 must also be upheld.
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F) THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS OF FRIVOLOUSNESS PURSUANT TO 12-121
AND IRCP 54(e)(l) ALSO SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF FEES AGAINST MR.
ROCKSTAHL AS A RULE 11 SANCTION
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(1) allows court's to award attorney's fees, against
legal counsel, as a sanction for signing any pleading or other filed document when, after a
reasonable inquiry, the contents of the document are either not supported by fact, or warranted
by law. lRCP 11 (a)(I). Because this standard for sanctions mirrors the definition of frivolous
conduct under 12-121 and Rule 54(e)( 1), signing of documents by Mr. Rockstahl, in bringing or
pursuing Harrison and Schutte's frivolous claims and defenses, is a violation of Rule 11,
justifying a sanction against Mr. Rockstahl.
Therefore, it was a proper exercise of the lower court's discretion to award fees, as a
sanction, against Mr. Rockstahl, for signing the Response to Partial Summary Judgment, and all
other documents defending the December 1, 2011 lien, without taking any steps to correct or
withdraw the elements of the lien for "payments" "taxes" and ''titlefact.'' (See, Appellant's
Proposed Augmented R., Vol. 3, pp. 843-44.) It was also therefore proper to sanction Mr.
Rockstahl's signature of the counterclaims, as any reasonable inquiry, even just into documents
attached to Ms. Urrutia's Complaint, would reveal that Ms. Urrutia's Deed of Trust was recorded
in 2007, prior to the start date of work stated in the May 16, 2012 lien; and would also reveal that
Ms. Urrutia lost all ownership interest in the arena property in 2007, prior to the 2008 and later
work claimed to have unjustly enriched Ms. Urrutia. (See, id)
Therefore, on essentially the same bases as fees were awardable pursuant to 12-121 and
Rule 54(e)(I), the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned Mr. Rockstahl for
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signing documents in pursuit of defending Ms. Urrutia's invalidation claim, and signing the
counterclaims.
G) HARRISON AND SCHUITE ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AITORNEY'S FEES ON

APPEAL
Harrison and Schutte assert that they are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 12-121, only. Fees pursuant to 12-121 can only be awarded ifthe court
finds that the claim or defense is brought or defended frivolously. IRCP 54(e)(I). The defense
of this appeal, contained herein, is in no manner frivolous, as it is based on the record, and upon
existing law. Therefore, even if Harrison and Schutte would prevail on appeal, they are not
entitled to attorney's fees on appeal.
IV.

RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

If a party is entitled to fees upon an action in the lower court, then, because an appeal,
even just regarding propriety offees, is simply a continuation of that action, attorney's fees on
appeal should also be awarded. RECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-R Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294,
298 (2010). Therefore, if this Court upholds the lower court's award of fees under 12-120(3),
and/or under 12-1211Rule 54(e)(1), Ms. Urrutia is also entitled to her reasonable attorney's fees
incurred to defend this appeal.
Furthermore, the same frivolous conduct committed below also continues in Harrison and
Schutte's appeal. Harrison and Schutte still assert that they were free to defend, and cause Ms.
Urrutia to incur expenses addressing, a mechanics lien claim that their counsel admitted included
elements patently not constituting labor or materials. Harrison and Schutte still assert that they
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were free to continue to defend a mechanics lien, even after they admitted in their depositions
that they made no improvements, but merely operated the arena property, within the last ninety
days prior to recording the lien. Harrison and Schutte still assert that Ms. Urrutia has no valid
interest in the property, and yet somehow was still benefited, and liable for unjust enrichment, by
their work on the arena property. And, most egregiously, Harrrison and Schutte claim the
validity of both mechanics liens, while also arguing that they were free to take all of the
materials constituting the alleged improvements, off of the property, as detached personal
property; in other words, arguing that they are justified in committing the tort of abuse of
process.
Therefore, the frivolous conduct and signing of frivolous briefs continues on appeal, and
Ms. Urrutia should therefore also, alternatively, be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal, against
both Defendants, and their counsel, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-123, and IRCP 11(a)(1).
V.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff prevailed, at summary judgment, on her only claim against Defendants.
Additionally, all of Defendants counterclaims against Plaintiff were dismissed with prejudice.
Therefore, Plaintiff is very plainly the prevailing party. As such, Plaintiff was properly awarded
attorney's fees because the basis of Harrison and Schutte's defense, and the basis of their
counterclaims, was an allegation of a transaction between themselves and Ms. Urrutia, where
Ms. Urrutia allegedly contracted with Harrison and Schutte to construct improvements to the
arena property.
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Additionally. it was also proper tor the lower court to, alternatively award fees on the
basis of frivolous claims and defense, because Harrison and Schutte's defense of the first Hen
\vas fi"ivolous. as it was plainly untimely recorded and included elements not constituting labor
or materials. Harrison and Schutte's counterclaims were also frivolous, because Ms. Urrutia's
2007 Deed of Trost is facially prior to Harrison and Schutte's second lien, claiming a work start
date in 2008: and because the post-2008 alleged improvements to the arena property could not
possibly have conferred a benefit upon Ms. Urrutia, when she was divested of her ownership
interest in 2007.
With all claims and defenses of Harrison and Schutte being frivolous. they certainly
committed frivolous conduct, and it was therefore also proper tix the lower court to alternatively
award the attorney's fees as a sanction, pursuant to Idaho Code Section t 2-123.
Finally, with the defenses and claims being wholly frivolous to bring and pursue. signing
documents in defense of the first mechanics lien, and signing the counterclaims, was additionally
a violation of Rule 11, and the award of fees against attorney Joe Rockstahl must also be upheld,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~l~ day of _November-., 2013.

Harry DeHaan Law Office
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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Joe Rockstahl
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